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A battle of principles: South Africa’s relations with Iran
Michal Onderco
∗
Department of Public Administration & Sociology, Erasmus University Rotterdam,
Rotterdam, The Netherlands
This paper provides a detailed case study and theoretical explanation for
one of the least appreciated bilateral relationships of democratic South
Africa. It analyses South Africa’s post-apartheid relations with Iran as a
case study to illustrate and discuss the contradictory principles that
appear to guide South Africa’s foreign policy. South Africa’s tempered
reaction to Iran’s nuclear programme is in contradiction with its non-
proliferation stance, but can be understood by looking into the ideology
of the ruling African National Congress.
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Introduction
South Africa’s relations with Iran are very little studied. This is surprising,
given that the relationship has so much of interest in it, and essentially captures
many of the dilemmas of South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policy. If we
start dissecting the relationship, we quickly discover old friendships, oil,
nuclear energy, big business, not to mention spying games and diamond cuf-
ﬂinks. This bilateral relationship in the post-apartheid era provides an outstand-
ing example with which to study the puzzles of democratic South Africa’s
foreign policy. Iran appears in so many areas of South Africa’s foreign
policy that the absence of interest in the relationship between the two regional
powers lies somewhere between surprising and disconcerting.
There were close connections between the African National Congress
(ANC) and Iran’s revolutionary regime in the days of the anti-apartheid
struggle; the ANC has been keen to refer to them frequently. But in the post-
apartheid era, Iran has been more likely to be a source of trouble for South
Africa’s leaders; South Africa has been torn over Iran. In the early years of
# 2016 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
∗Email: michal.onderco@eui.eu
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, 2016
Vol. 54, No. 2, 252–267, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14662043.2016.1151168
post-apartheid’s South Africa’s foreign policy, the country tried to position
itself as a traditional middle-power, with the appropriate focus on human
rights and being a good global citizen (see Mandela’s 1993 Foreign Affairs
article). The early post-apartheid experiences of South Africa led to internal dis-
cussions about how much of a good global citizen South Africa should be and
where its allegiances should lie (Geldenhuys, 2013; Lipton, 2009). The conﬂict
within the South Africa’s foreign policy became obvious in relations with Iran.
As the dispute over Iran’s nuclear programme became the deﬁning feature
of Iran’s international image in the twenty-ﬁrst century, it became difﬁcult for
South Africa to position itself. It could not side with the West, as its non-
proliferation credentials would lead one to expect, because this would be
seen as a betrayal of a fellow non-aligned country, and economic ties and inter-
ests called for the advancement of working relations with Iran. But nor could it
side with Iran, because it had no interest in belonging to an odd medley of anti-
imperialist powers occupying that corner, and because South Africa’s non-
proliferation credentials were too precious to be discarded so quickly. Relations
with Iran, hence, pitted ties with the West against ties with the non-aligned
world.
The relationship between the two is also of interest to international relations
scholars, and not only those interested in South Africa’s foreign relations. It
demonstrates a rising power’s attitude towards an issue of global importance,
outside of its region, where it has a vested (normative) interest. There are not
many bilateral relationships of BRICS countries to rival this. In the paper, I
provide an analysis of South Africa’s relations with Iran since the end of apart-
heid. I argue that while walking a tightrope between the West and Iran, South
Africa has lent more frequently than not towards Iran.
I argue that this balancing act is related to the formative experience of the
ANC in the anti-apartheid struggle; it is here that the dominant world view of
the ANC was shaped. Given the prominence of the ANC and the party’s role in
shaping post-apartheid South Africa’s foreign policy, the world view the ANC
leaders espoused had a deﬁning role in determining the course of South Africa’s
foreign policy. Given that these views have been predominantly anti-imperial-
ist, the direction of South Africa’s foreign policy is less puzzling than it appears
on the surface.
This paper is divided into four sections. In the ﬁrst, I outline the argument
surrounding party ideology and foreign policy. I then discuss brieﬂy the histori-
cal background of the relationship between Iran and South Africa. While this
paper focuses on post-apartheid links, the historical background is crucial to
understanding some elements of the relationship. I then proceed to outline
South Africa’s reaction to Iran’s nuclear dossier, given that it has so strongly
marked relations between the two countries. I follow this with a brief
comment on economic relations between the two countries, before drawing
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conclusions about South Africa’s foreign relations and sketching brieﬂy the
outlook for the future.
The ANC’s intellectual stewardship
Scholarship on political parties and foreign policy tends to underline arguments
about the left–right divide and how it translates into different attitudes towards
the use of force, development aid, or migration (Mello, 2014; Rathbun, 2004;
The´rien & Noel, 2000; Verbeek & Zaslove, 2015). This argument follows the
logic of the increasing politicisation of foreign policy: that politics does not end
at ‘the water’s edge’, but instead parties contest what foreign policy should look
like (Zu¨rn, 2014). While this argument could be applied to South Africa (as any
observer can point to differences between the ANC on the one hand, and the
Democratic Alliance or the African Christian Democratic Party on the other),
it will not be taken up in this paper. For the simple fact of the sheer numerical
superiority of the ANC, alternative parties have never had the opportunity to
translate their views into foreign policy. Instead, I argue that to understand
South Africa’s foreign policy, we need to understand the ideas that shape the
ruling party’s view of the world.
Such an argument is liberal (in the spirit of Moravcsik, 1997), because it
takes the preferences of individual actors seriously.1 I argue in this article
that South Africa’s foreign policy towards Iran is heavily affected by the
ANC’s intellectual stewardship of the country, steering towards an anti-
imperialistism.
The ANC has been ‘the custodian and steward of South Africa’s foreign
policy’ in the post-apartheid era.2 The party’s views on foreign affairs were
often governed by its leaders, and therefore party leaders tended to be those
who also drove the country’s foreign policy (Alden & Le Pere, 2003;
Nathan, 2011). This imprint comes from the party’s experience in exile and
during the anti-apartheid years. The ANC’s foreign policy mixes third-world
Marxism with the anti-imperialism of the ﬁght against the apartheid regime,
seen as being both the epitome of imperialism, and as being supported by
the imperialist powers (Lipton, 2009; Sidiropoulos, 2008).3 Some commenta-
tors argue that this intellectual heritage is associated with an altruistic attitude
towards less powerful countries and their advancement (Bischoff, 2003), or
with a desire to emerge as an alternative norm entrepreneur (Neethling,
2012). However, these discussions are not very relevant to the present paper,
as it focuses on the intellectual origins of South Africa’s foreign policy, and
how this translates into relations with Iran.
What is certain, however, is that this world view sees the world as a place of
fundamental struggle between the oppressor and the oppressed. In the ANC’s
world view, the oppressor today is the West (or the North), which oppresses
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weaker, smaller states within a fundamentally unjust system. We only need to
look at the documents released ahead of the ANC’s conference in October 2015
to understand how the ANC sees the world. At the beginning of the section
dealing with international relations it is stated that ‘the ANC is a revolutionary
national liberation movement which is an integral part of the international revo-
lutionary movement to liberate humanity from the bondage of imperialism and
neo colonialism’ (African National Congress, 2015, p. 161). This statement is
followed by a quotation from Lenin: ‘revolutionary scientiﬁc theory is the
weapon to make us judge and deﬁne the methods of struggle correctly’
(African National Congress, 2015, p. 162). The document then continues to
rail against Western imperialism (‘The sudden collapse of socialism in the
world altered completely the balance of forces in favour of imperialism’,
p. 162). Even these brief quotations signal already that a Marxist and anti-
imperialist framework still heavily inﬂuence the ANC’s current ideology.
Such a perception of the world leads to a foreign policy that advocates a
radical overhaul of the existing global order. This includes, for example, pro-
posals calling for more voting power for itself and other countries of the
Global South in the Bretton Woods institutions, or the Security Council (Wood-
ward, 2007). The White Paper on Foreign Policy states that ‘South Africa will
actively participate in the BRICS, whose members are reshaping the global
economic and political order’ (Building a Better World, 2011, p. 26). This res-
onates with the Ten Year Review, published in 2003, which called on South
Africa to work towards ‘reform and strengthen[ing of] the multilateral rules-
bound political, economic, security and environmental organisations in order
to advance the interests of developing countries’ (Policy Co-ordination and
Advisory Services of The Presidency, 2003, p. 58). Such initiatives have the
goal to bring more power to developing countries, a traditional goal in
Marxist and anti-imperialist thought (Habib, 2009).
In the particular case of Iran, the international community’s punitive
response towards it also plays into another piece of the ANC’s intellectual
baggage: the view that the only suitable strategy to resolve problems is
negotiation. The ANC’s successful experience of negotiation with the apart-
heid regime has led the party to the conviction that negotiation can always
and everywhere be successful (Nathan, 2011). This led South Africa to advo-
cate for negotiation to solve conﬂicts in, for example, Zimbabwe (Inter-
national Crisis Group, 2008), Libya (Boyd-Judson, 2005; Wonacott, 2011)
and Sudan (Nathan, 2011). While numerous scholars have argued that the
penchant for negotiation is the trademark of South Africa’s post-apartheid
foreign policy (Alden & Le Pere, 2003), in this particular case, it provided
South Africa with a welcome opportunity to demonstrate its own historical
experience and use it as a tool against the Western approach of sanctions
and isolation.
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In the case of relations between Iran and South Africa, anti-imperialist
ideology provides the unique (and possibly the only) basis for comprehending
South Africa’s reaction to Iran’s nuclear programme, and to understand better
relations between the two countries, as outlined in the following sections. The
traditional predilection towards negotiations provided a suitable language and
platform to advance such an ideology.
Back to the future
South Africa enjoyed good relations with Iran under the Shah, both economi-
cally and politically. The situation changed after the Islamic Revolution. The
new regime cut ties with the apartheid regime after 1979 and supported the
anti-apartheid movement. The ofﬁcial story, however, omits that the Islamic
regime in Tehran owned a stake in the Natref reﬁnery, ‘inherited’ from the
Shah’s era. This meant that Iran was legally obliged to sell oil to South
Africa for the reﬁnery. Given that apartheid South Africa excelled in the pro-
duction of advanced military technology, and the Islamic regime needed
weapons during the Iran–Iraq war, in 1985 the two agreed to exchange
weapons (South Africa to Iran) for oil (Iran to South Africa) in a $750
million deal (De Quaasteniet & Aarts, 1995). Iran was also active on the
spot market, where the apartheid regime purchased most of its oil. By the
time of apartheid’s collapse, South Africa imported between 65 and 90 per
cent of its oil from Iran (Cohen, 1996; Streek, 1996). Yet, the ofﬁcial anti-
Western and anti-imperialist discourse, emanating from Tehran, was akin to
the discourse emanating from the ANC in exile, which saw the USA and the
UK as the props of the apartheid regime. The ANC and the regime in Tehran
developed good ties, and after the fall of apartheid, the ANC leaders called
Iran ‘a friendly country’ (The Citizen, 1994). This view persisted till today:
the 12th meeting of the South Africa–Iran joint commission in Tehran in
2015, the South African Minister for International Relations and Cooperation,
Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, reiterated this position: ‘The Islamic Republic
stood by us during our darkest days, cutting ties with the apartheid regime.
Your revolution was our revolution. You showed us that emancipation was
possible, whatever the odds’ (SAnews, 2015a).
Bilateral relations between the two countries were ofﬁcially re-established
in 1994, following a 15-year break (during this period Iran was ofﬁcially rep-
resented by the Iranian interests section of the Swiss embassy), after the UN
General Assembly called on states to restore economic relations with South
Africa (United Nations, 1993). One year later, a joint binational commission
was established, originally at the deputy minister level, dealing at the outset
mostly with trade issues (Department of International Relations and
Cooperation, 2006). The Commission was one of the most active in the
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post-apartheid era; many such binational commissions were established, but
few met more than a handful of times, whereas the one involving Iran initially
met annually. After the tenth meeting in 2010, the meetings have been less
frequent – the eleventh took place in 2013, and the twelvth in 2015. Despite
Iran’s pleas to upgrade the status of the Commission to ministerial level,
South Africa rejected such proposals until recently. Over time, issues of
regional policy and the Middle East peace process were included. Iran also
showed an interest in South Africa’s nuclear expertise, but South Africa’s
leaders always rejected any cooperation with Iran on its nuclear programme
(Agence France Presse, 2005; Sunday Tribune, 1995; The Argus, 1995). On
the ofﬁcial level, however, Iran’s nuclear dossier soon overshadowed other
issues. However, an ofﬁcial Communique´ from the 2015 meeting, lists 103
action points, though most of them are rather generic (such as point 82,
which stipulates that ‘[b]oth sides have agreed to enhance relations between
ﬁnancial institutions of the two countries’; see Department of International
Relations and Cooperation, 2015).
Iran’s nuclear programme
Iran’s nuclear programme put South Africa in a difﬁcult position. A signiﬁcant
contribution to the building of South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policy has
been the narrative of the non-proliferation poster child. In its last years the
apartheid government gave up nuclear weapons (Purkitt & Burgess, 2005;
van Wyk, 2009), and the new post-apartheid government led the consensus
towards the indeﬁnite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (Van Der Merwe, 2003). Attempt to position itself as a
middle-power, bridge-builder between the West and the non-aligned countries
meant that South Africa could establish itself as a prominent actor with legiti-
macy and stature (Flemes, 2009; Taylor, 2006). Today, South Africa is a
member of all the non-proliferation clubs and institutions – one of the few
countries in the Global South to hold this status (Purkitt & Burgess, 2005).
At the same time, the ANC’s leadership, as outlined above, has been turning
towards the developing countries and theGlobal South, and away from theWest.
This created a challenge for SouthAfrica’s reaction to Iran’s nuclear programme.
On the one hand, South Africa’s non-proliferation credentials required the
country to be concerned about Iran’s behaviour, given that Iran has been
found in violation of its commitments under international law (International
Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], 2003a, 2003b, 2005). On the other, the
feeling of solidarity between two developing countries would nudge South
Africa towards a conciliatory position vis-a`-vis Iran. The result was a policy
inwhich South Africa scrambled to balance its interests, leading to The Econom-
ist in 2010 calling South Africa ‘one of Iran’s doughtiest supporters at the UN’.
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Ever since 2002, when Iran’s nuclear programme became a signiﬁcant topic
in international politics, South Africa refused to support the use of coercive
tools against Iran. The country has pushed consistently to give more time to
Iran, preferring to deal with Iran in the International Atomic Energy
Agency’s (IAEA) Board of Governors, and accusing the West of ulterior
motives in its dealings with Iran.
Initially, Iran’s nuclear programme was discussed in the IAEA Board of
Governors, where South Africa enjoys a permanent seat. Here, South Africa
consistently rejected reporting the situation to the UN Security Council
(UNSC). South African diplomats argued that the international community’s
reaction should be ‘talk, talk, talk not isolation’ (WikiLeaks, 2006), and that
referral to the UNSC would ‘split’ the Board (WikiLeaks, 2004).
When the Board ﬁnally voted on ﬁnding Iran in non-compliance with its obli-
gations in September 2005, criticising Iran’s ‘failures and breaches of its obli-
gations to comply with its IAEA Safeguards Agreement’ (IAEA, 2005), South
Africa abstained from the vote (Kerr, 2005). Two months later, when the
IAEA Director-General Muhammad El-Baradei submitted a report stating that
Iran’s compliance with the requirements of the September resolution was only
partial, South Africa commended Iran on its compliance and pleaded for more
time so that the IAEA could ‘clarify certain issues pertaining to the Islamic
Republic of Iran’s peaceful nuclear programme’ (‘Statement by South Africa’s
Governor’, 2005). South Africa also proposed that Iran should be allowed to con-
tinue enriching uranium, a view rejected by Western diplomats (Hibbs, 2005).
But in February 2006, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution
referring Iran to the UNSC. One month later, South Africa’s Governor and
Ambassador to the IAEA, Abdul Minty, in his talk with the Parliamentary
Committee on International Relations criticised the move again and said that
the government ‘was opposed to moves by the UNSC to stop Iran’s civilian
nuclear programme’ (Africa News, 2006). The same points were reiterated
by President Mbeki, and Foreign Minister Dlamini-Zuma in her meeting
with Iran’s foreign minister.
There are two explanations that South Africa offers for this insistence on the
authority of the IAEA, versus the UNSC. Firstly, as emerged during author’s
interviews with South Africa’s diplomats, the IAEA was thought to possess
technical expertise that makes it ideal for dealing with nuclear matters; sec-
ondly, the referral to the UNSC was understood as a ‘mission creep’, the expan-
sion of the Council’s activity to new areas. This is a counterintuitive position.
One could expect that a newly elected Security Council member at the time,
aiming to acquire a permanent seat on the Council (Alden & Vieira, 2005),
would be more interested in bolstering the importance of the Security Council.
South Africa became a UNSC non-permanent member in 2007, after the
Council adopted the ﬁrst round of sanctions against Iran in December 2006
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(United Nations, 2006). By March of 2007, the UNSC was discussing further
sanctions, after Iran failed to comply with the requirements of the previous res-
olution. However, South Africa proposed trimming the list of sanctioned enti-
ties and the introduction of a freeze on UN sanctions in return for a freeze on
Iran’s nuclear activities. The ﬁve permanent members rejected the proposal.
South Africa, holding a monthly rotating Presidency of the UNSC, reproached
the permanent members ‘as if [the resolution] is written by God or has the
wisdom of God in it’ (UPI, 2007). Yet, after two days of heated discussions,
South Africa voted in favour of the resolution, arguing that this was the only
possible option to avoid war, and did not address the concerns about the
discrepancy.
However, South African ofﬁcials were still unhappy with the vote and in
May, Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) Direc-
tor-General Ntsaluba argued that South Africa ought not to think that ‘if there is
any undermining of international law and existing agreements on Iran it will not
happen to us’ (SABC News, 2006), airing similar statements made by Iran in
the context of the Non-Aligned Movement.
Only three months later, Foreign Minister Dlamini-Zuma of South Africa,
in her budget speech, called on all parties ‘to enter into dialogue and nego-
tiations in order to seek a comprehensive and sustainable solution’ (‘Address
by the Minister of Foreign Affairs’ 2007). In March 2008, while still a non-per-
manent member of the UNSC, South Africa again argued strongly against the
adoption of further sanctions against Iran. South African diplomats argued in
favour of extending the time limits for IAEA-Iran cooperation, and the Direc-
tor-General of the DIRCO, George Nene, claimed that ‘nobody expects a ter-
rible atomic catastrophe to take place in a month’ (IRNA, 2008). Two weeks
later, Abdul Minty joined the chorus, arguing that all the issues had been clari-
ﬁed (‘Notes following media brieﬁng by ambassador’, 2008). Yet, despite these
claims, South Africa again voted in favour of sanctions against Iran, contrary to
expectations.
The Iranian reaction to the vote was one of disappointment. Iran’s former
Ambassador to South Africa wrote an opinion piece, in which he said South
Africa’s actions were ‘no way to treat a friend’ (Ghorbanoghli, 2007); and
Iran’s deputy foreign minister, Sayed Abas Araghchi, during a visit to Pretoria,
stated that Iran was ‘a little bit disappointed’ (Kaninda, 2007). In interviews
with the author, South African diplomats conﬁded that Iran’s ofﬁcials were pri-
vately unhappy with the vote, but never publicly reproached South Africa.
South African ofﬁcials, for their part, never addressed the discrepancy
between their words and deeds when voting on the sanctions. In interviews,
some diplomats admit that they were disappointed by the lack of new evidence,
which Iran had repeatedly promised. While South African diplomats may have
started having doubts about Iran’s sincerity, the party line was established by
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Abdul Minty, and no ofﬁcials (including top-level DIRCO ofﬁcials) wanted to
cross him (WikiLeaks, 2007).
South Africa’s involvement, and in particular Abdul Minty’s strong per-
sonal involvement, were likely also the main reasons why Minty failed in his
candidacy to lead the IAEA. When he ran for election in 2009, he was not
elected in the elections he contested with the Japanese counter-candidate
Yukiya Amano (during the campaign, Minty made 63 ﬂights which cost the
South African government over 750,000 Rand, as revealed in the government’s
response to a question from a parliamentarian; see Parliamentary Monitoring
Group, 2010).
In 2010, the Speaker of South Africa’s parliament, Max Vuyisile Sisulu, tra-
velled to Tehran to meet his Iranian counterpart, and praised the ‘good and
growing’ relations between the two countries, touting Iran as a friend of
African countries, and admonishing the ‘arrogant’ policy of the USA
towards the country (Iran Daily, 2010). Despite occasional meetings between
the two countries’ diplomats and parliamentarians, however, South Africa
remained relatively disengaged from Iran, having been forced to abandon
trade ties in 2012 due to sanctions on Iran.
And while in 2013 the Joint Commission met again, South Africa’s state-
ments on Iran’s nuclear programme have been less pronounced, except for
praising Iran for on-going negotiations with the West, and calls for lifting the
sanctions (SABC News, 2013). In July 2015, after the deal between Iran and
the P5+1 was announced, South Africa (unsurprisingly) welcomed the agree-
ment. ‘This historic agreement is testament to the success of a negotiated and
diplomatic solution, to which South Africa had steadfastly and continuously
lent its full support’, said South Africa’s foreign minister, while lauding the
lifting of ‘unilaterally imposed sanctions’ and hailing Iran’s ‘inalienable right
to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes’ (SAnews, 2015b).
Economy
The lively and positive political relations between the two countries were also
translated into a business relationship. As stated above, oil has connected the
two countries for a long time. However, there is more to the economic relations
between South Africa and Iran than oil; there is a particularly sizeable South
African investment in Iran.
South Africa has been historically dependent on Iran’s oil, and though it has
decreased that dependence, in 2012 Iran was still the most important single sup-
plier of Iran’s oil, accounting for approximately 27 per cent of South African
imports (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2015). Yet, in 2012, the
pressing sanctions on the Central Bank of Iran, imposed by the USA and the
EU, forced South Africa to ﬁnd an alternative source of oil, and cease
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Iranian imports (IOL News, 2012). South Africa switched to Saudi Arabia for
supplies and continued the search for alternative suppliers in Africa. In 2013,
60 per cent of its oil was imported from Saudi Arabia and Iran, and 40 per
cent from African sources, as reported in a reply by South Africa’s Deputy Pre-
sident Cyril Ramaphosa to a question in Parliament (Parliamentary Monitoring
Group, 2015). Immediately following the announcement of the agreement
between Iran and the P5+1 South Africa announced the expansion of its oil
trade with Iran, and plans for a visit to Iran by South Africa’s deputy president,
Ramaphosa, were announced. As of the time of writing (September 2015), no
agreement has yet been signed.
In addition to oil, other South African businesses entered Iran’s market. In
2011, 31 per cent of South Africa’s credit insurance exposure was in Iran,
though the percentage decreased to 8 per cent by 2015 (Export Credit Insurance
Corporation, 2012, 2015). Sasol, South Africa’s energy and chemical giant,
held a 50 per cent stake in Arya Sasol, a joint venture with Iran’s National Pet-
rochemical Company, located in the Pars Special Economic Energy Zone (in the
province of Bushehr), reportedly worth approximately US$900 million in 2012
(Faucon & Maylie, 2012). However, as an New York Stock Exchange-listed
company, over time the asset became a nuisance and in 2013, after taking over
US$300 million in write-downs, SASOL sold its share (Crowley, 2013).
Another important South African investor in Iran is MTN, a telecommuni-
cations conglomerate. MTN, under the leadership of the current Deputy Presi-
dent Ramaphosa, successfully won a tender for 49 per cent of Irancell. Today,
24.4 per cent of the total income of the MTN Group is generated in Iran, with
44.4 million subscribers, and high proﬁt margins (42.8 per cent; EBIDTA). The
Iranian market is the third largest for MTN, which controls more than 45 per
cent of the market (MTN Group, 2014, 2015). Yet, the investment in Iran
has also been a major source of difﬁculties for MTN. The company has been
unable, over a long period of time, to extract proﬁt from Iran. Approximately
one billion US dollars was trapped in Iran because of the international
banking sanctions, which prevented the group from accessing dividends and
loan repayments (Reuters Africa, 2015). MTN ﬁred the group’s chief ﬁnancial
ofﬁcer after he attempted to circumvent the banking sanctions (Fin24, 2015),
while the conditions of the award of the licence to MTN continue to be
murky. MTN’s main competitor, Turkish Turkcell, alleged that MTN used
bribery to gain the licence.4 Reports surfaced that Iranian ofﬁcials, led by
then-chief negotiator and current president, Rouhani, attempted at the time of
the award of the contract to exchange the award of the licence for favourable
votes in international institutions, and defence deals (with questionable
success, it needs to be added; see Naidoo, McKune, & Bru¨mmer, 2012) A
former ambassador of South Africa to Iran was suspended because of alle-
gations of bribery (Maylie, 2012). Ofﬁcial reports, however, cleared MTN of
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any wrongdoing. At the same time, MTN was accused of cooperating with
Iran’s government in cracking down on the so-called Green Movement follow-
ing the 2009 presidential elections in Iran and shared its data willingly with the
country’s intelligence apparatus (McKune & Naidoo, 2012).
The economic relations between the two countries provided an opportunity
to ‘grease’ the political relationship, but it turned out to be problematic for
South African companies; curiously mirroring the political relationship.
While some of the problems were externally induced (especially the sanctions
placed on Iran), the situation left South African businesses vulnerable to inﬂu-
ences they (and their government) had no control over, whether directly or in
terms of damage-control.
Conclusion
South Africa’s relations with Iran since the end of apartheid illuminate the
puzzles of democratic South Africa’s foreign policy. Driven by the revolution-
ary anti-imperialist zeal of its elites, and its (somewhat contradictory) strong
business bent seeking expansion, the country’s foreign policy is at odds with
what expectations would be, based on the early normative commitments
expressed by post-apartheid South Africa’s political leaders, particularly
when it comes to human rights and nuclear nonproliferation. In the particular
case of relations with Iran, this meant that solidarity with a fellow developing
country trumped the concerns about norm violation or non-proliferation.
Despite strong economic interests, these seem to play a secondary role (if
any role at all); South Africa’s foreign policy was instead predominantly
shaped by the ANC’s ideology. South Africa’s reaction to Iran’s nuclear pro-
gramme was distinguished by its distrust of the West’s motives, a preference
for large forums, and the presumption of the credibility in Iran’s claims.
South Africa also rejected sanctions – not only because they harmed the coun-
try’s own businesses (which never appeared as an argument), but primarily
because South African leaders questioned their usefulness. The ANC’s
special position in crafting democratic South Africa’s foreign policy, and the
ideological leanings of the party’s leadership, help explain the pattern.
So what will the future bring? With the economic opening up of Iran, one
can reasonably expect an improved supply of oil from Iran to South Africa, as
well as increased ease for South Africa’s companies to conduct business in Iran.
As Iran’s nuclear industry advances, scientiﬁc and industrial cooperation may
take place. Iran will probably continue to be interested in the products of South
Africa’s defence industry. But the focus on developing, non-aligned,
‘oppressed’ countries makes Iran and South Africa a rather suitable two to
tango in the future. Iran and South Africa may forge coalitions of convenience
in international forums, to block Western countries or to help steer the agenda.
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Such cooperation would surely bring more conﬂicts with the normative stan-
dards of South Africa’s foreign policy, and will ensure bewilderment among
South Africa’s Western partners.
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Notes
1. I have elsewhere argued that the goals of South Africa’s foreign policy are funda-
mentally realist (Onderco, 2012). There is no inconsistency in arguing that South
Africa’s foreign policy follows realist goals, and looking within the state to
explain the origins of such goals.
2. Garth Le Pere, interviewed by the author, February 2012.
3. It is an interesting question whether the internal–external struggle distinction
matters in this case. The internal struggle – the United Democratic Front –
created what Raymond Suttner called ‘preﬁgurative democracy’ (Suttner, 2005,
p. 63), with emphasis on ‘people’s power’. But Suttner (2005) also reminds us
that ideological inﬂuences upon UDF were similar as those upon ANC, and there-
fore we probably should not read too much into this distinction for the present pur-
poses, if only because it is the ANC that was the ‘victor’ in the end.
4. Turkcell’s claims continue to be dismissed by various courts for lack of jurisdiction.
See IT News Africa (2014).
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